Introduction 24
In recent years there has been a significant growth in wind power in the UK. Between 2008 and 2014, 25 the installed capacity of wind turbines increased from 2.9 GW to 12.4 GW and the proportion of 26 electricity provided by wind power increased from 1.5% to 9.3% [1] . Much of this growth is the result 27 of the development of offshore wind. Following the construction of the offshore wind farms in the 28 second round of developments (started by the Crown Estate in 2003); the offshore capacity has risen 29 to approximately 5 GW (40 % of total wind capacity). Much of this new capacity has been installed in 30 a small number of very large wind farms which are located in clusters. For example, in the Thames 31
Estuary alone there is approximately 1.7 GW of capacity [2] . This trend looks set to continue as the 32 third round of offshore wind development in the UK, launched in 2009, identified 9 zones within 33 which a number of individual wind farms could be located. Consequently, following the construction 34 of the round 3 wind farms the majority of GB wind capacity would be located offshore in clusters of 35 very large wind farms [3, 4] . 36 Concentrating large amounts of capacity in a small number of wind farms in close proximity can lead 37 to large regional ramps in generation on time scales of minutes to hours as the impact of local 38 meteorological phenomena could simultaneously impact production in several sites. Drew et al [5] 39 showed that on time scales of less than 6 hours, the ramps in generation of the cluster of wind farms in 40 the Thames Estuary were larger than those of the more spatially dispersed onshore wind farms. Large 41 fluctuations in power on short time scales have also been observed at the Horns Rev wind farm [6, 7] . 42
Given the large capacity of the offshore wind farms, these fluctuations could present a challenge to 43 National Grid, the system operator responsible for ensuring a balance between supply and demand of 44 electricity, particularly if they are not accurately forecasted. 45 Making reliable forecasts of exactly where and when local ramping events will occur is a significant 46 challenge. Potter et al. [8] identified three types of errors; phase error, magnitude error and location 47 error. A phase error is defined as a ramping event which has the magnitude accurately predicted but 48 occurs at the wrong time. A magnitude error is defined as a ramping event that is forecasted to occur 49 at the correct time but with the wrong magnitude. A location error is defined as an error in the 50 geographical location of the meteorological feature which produces the ramping event. 51
The predictability of ramping events has been investigated using a range of methods. state of the atmosphere) and the complete set of forecasts is known as an ensemble. By using this 64 approach the individual ensemble members can be analysed to get a better idea of which possible 65 weather events may occur. Cannon et al [15] showed that using an ensemble of NWP forecasts of GB-66 aggregated wind power does have an improved skill of ramp forecasting relative to climatology up to 67 a lead time of 7 days. On smaller spatial scales, Bossavy et al [13] showed that conditioning 68 probability forecasts by the number of NWP ensemble members forecasting a ramp can improve the 69 reliability of the forecast for a multi megawatt wind farm in the South of France. 70
Here we present a case study to investigate the impact of the high frequency ramping of a cluster of 71 offshore wind farms on the national level power system (in terms of balancing costs), if it is not 72 forecasted by the system operator. We then explore the effectiveness of state-of-the-art high 73 resolution NWP models of forecasting events of this nature. 74
To achieve the aims of this study a wide range of data have been used. The first section presents the 75 generation characteristics of the cluster of wind farms in the Thames Estuary (currently the largest 76 cluster of offshore wind farms in the world) for 2014 and quantifies the power ramps on time scales of 77 less than 6 hours. The second section investigates the ramping event which occurred on 3 rd November 78 2014 in more detail, highlighting the impact on the national level power system using data on volume 79 of imbalance and balancing prices. Figure 1 ) with a total capacity of 1.7 GW, which equates 86 to approximately 14% of the installed wind capacity in the UK. The aggregated power output from all 87 wind farms in the cluster at 5 min resolution for the whole of 2014 has been obtained (data coverage 88 >99%). 
91
The generation data were analysed to assess the high frequency ramping events during 2014. The 92 definition of a wind power ramp typically refers to the change in power output over a defined time 93 scale, usually seconds to minutes [16, 17] or hours [18, 19] . In this study a ramp, R, is defined as the 94 change in output of the cluster (expressed in the form of capacity factor, CF) over a given time 95 interval, Δt (as shown in equation 1). 96 is 180 minutes (Δt=180 mins). In general, the majority of the ramping events are relatively small, for 103 the longest time window considered (Δt=360 mins), 90% of the ramps lie within the range -37% to 104 35%. However, a small number of very large ramping events also occurred. For example, the 105 maximum ramp over a time window of 60 mins was 66%, this equates to a change in power output of 106 1.1 GW, which could make balancing the power network problematic if not well forecast.
107
One of the largest ramp-up events occurred on 3rd November 2014 (67% in a period of 2 hours and 108 45 minutes). This was immediately followed by one of the largest ramp-down events (73% in a period 109 of 1 hour and 50 minutes). This day is therefore used as a case study to consider the potential impact 110 of high frequency local ramping events on the power system and to investigate whether high 111 resolution meteorological forecast models can capture events of this nature. 112 Global and Regional Ensemble Prediction System (MOGREPS) which produces a forecast on a 120 resolution of approximately 2.2.km using 11 ensemble members and a control forecast (see Table 2  121 for further details). This study also considers the GB-aggregated hourly wind power forecast produced 122
by National Grid, which is updated 4 times per day and published via the Elexon Portal England which led to high wind speeds and heavy rainfall in the Thames Estuary (see figure 3 ). After 130 the front moved eastwards away from the cluster of farms, their wind generation reduced 131 dramatically, falling from 93.2% of capacity at 09:25 to only 8.6% at 13:00 (see Figure 4a ). 132
Following this, a trough moved across the region which corresponds with an increase in wind power 133 generation and by 15:45 the output was back up to 76% at 15:45, however this ramp had a short 134 duration and by 17:35 the output had reduced to only 3% (see Figure 4) . The ramping event between 135 13:00 and 17:35 equates to an increase in power output of 1.1 GW within 2 hours and 45 minutes, 136 followed almost immediately by a 1.24 GW reduction in power output within 1 hour and 50 minutes. 137 
139
Due to large proportion of the national wind capacity located in the Thames Estuary, the ramping 140 event is clearly observed in the GB-aggregated wind generation (Figure 4a ). Between 13:40 and 15:55 141 wind generation increased from 1.7 GW (capacity factor of 20%) to 2.9 GW (capacity factor of 35%) 142 before reducing down to 0.8 GW (capacity factor of 10%) at 17:45. This indicates that the ramping 143 event was highly localised to the Thames Estuary and therefore related to a meteorological feature 144 with a relatively small spatial extent. Figure 4 (b) shows the National Grid forecast for 3/11/2014 for a 145 range of lead times. In general, the forecast accurately captures the overall trend of the generation for 146 all lead times, but the ramping event is not predicted in any of the forecasts. We speculate that this 147 may be due to a smoothing effect caused by ensemble averaging; however full details of the forecast 148 are not available. 149 However, for each settlement period, a supplier might have incorrectly forecasted their demand or a 159 supplier might not be able to generate the contracted amount and therefore there can be an imbalance 160 between supply and demand. It is then the responsibility of the system operator (National Grid) to 161 make the necessary actions to balance the system. This is achieved by using bids and offers in the 162 balancing market. A bid is a proposal by a supplier to increase demand or a generator to reduce 163
generation. An offer is a proposal by a generator to increase generation or a supplier to reduce 164 demand. 165
For this case study, the final physical notifications of the wind farms in the Thames Estuary did not 166
show the ramping event. Furthermore, it was not captured by the system operator's wind power 167 forecast and therefore led to a large imbalance of the electricity network. As a result, National Grid 168 was required to perform a number of actions in the balancing mechanism. The net imbalance volume 169 (NIV) is the net of the buying and selling actions taken in the balancing mechanism. When NIV is 170 positive it means that the system is short and therefore the system operator is accepting offers to 171 increase generation. Conversely, when NIV is negative, the system is long and the system operator is 172 accepting bids to reduce generation. 173 Figure 5 shows that in mid-afternoon (14:30 to 16:00) on 3/11/2014, the market was long, peaking at -174 570 MWh at 15:30. This is a result of the unexpected pick-up in the generation in the Thames 175
Estuary. By 17:00, the generation had drastically reduced and the market was short by 820 MWh (the 176 3 rd largest negative imbalance for this time of day in 2014). This large imbalance coincided with 177 winter darkness peak and therefore the electricity demand for this settlement period was very high, 178 47.6 GW (in the top 2.5 percentile of half hourly demand in 2014). Consequently, there were fewer 179 options, in terms of generation units, available to National Grid to balance the system. As a result, 180 short term operating reserve (STOR) was deployed, which is expensive and therefore had implications 181 on the system prices. 
185
In November 2014, the costs associated with balancing mechanism bids and offers were given by the 186 system buy price (SBP) and system sell price (SSP). The SBP is the rate paid by a party with a net 187 deficit of imbalance energy and the SSP is the rate paid to parties with a net surplus of imbalance 188 energy. Figure 6 shows the ramping event had a significant impact on both the SSP and SBP. At 189 17:00, when the system had a large deficit, the SBP increased to £183 The output from the high resolution models has been assessed to determine the meteorological 207 conditions on 3 rd November 2014. Figure 7 shows the rainfall and wind from 12:00 and 15:00 UTC 208 derived by a single ensemble member of the MOGREPS forecast initialised at 09:00 UTC. The 209 figures clearly show the elevated wind speeds and heavy rainfall in the English Channel associated 210 with the main front which passed over the region earlier in the day. There is also a feature behind the 211 front with large amounts of rainfall which propagates from south west to north east along the front. 212 This is related to the trough marked on the analysis chart at 12 and 18 UTC (see Figure 3) . The winds 213 associated with this feature are relatively low over land but pick up as it passes over the Thames 214
Estuary at 14:00 UTC. 215
Complete analysis of the dynamics of this feature is beyond the scope of this paper; however there are 216 several things of importance to consider. Firstly, the acceleration of the winds as the rainfall feature 217 passes from the land into the Thames estuary, which is possibly due to change in the surface 218 roughness. The most important thing to note is the way that the frontal region is comprised of small 219 scale banded structures with can lead to large local fluctuations in wind speed. The magnitude of the 220 uncertainty in the location and detailed structure of such banded features is larger than their spatial 221 scale meaning that ensemble mean forecasts will fail to capture them (this is explored detail in section Figure 8a shows that using the wind speed at the exact location of the turbines ('point') produces an 237 underestimate of the ramp in generation. Between 15:00 and 16:00 the capacity factor of the region 238 increases by 19%, before reducing by 17% by 18:00 this equates to a magnitude error of 30%. 239
However, using the maximum wind speed within a 10 km area of each of the turbines produces a 240
clear, large mid-afternoon ramp up of 44% between 15:00 and 17:00 followed by a ramp down of 241 40%. This reduces the magnitude error to only 8%, but there is still a 2 hour phase error in the 242
forecast. This indicates that while the model was able to produce the band of post-frontal high wind 243 speeds, it did not have the timing and position of the feature exactly correct. 244
By using the area maximum wind speed method to determine wind farm power output, there is an 245 indication of a large ramp present in the forecast from the UKV 1.5 model out to a lead time of 24 246 hours. Figure 8b shows that the forecast initialised at 15:00 on 02/11/2014 produces a ramp of 41% 247 (magnitude error of 8%), however the ramp peaks at 1300UTC therefore there is a 2 hour phase error. 248
As the forecast lead time decreases the representation of the ramp improves and by 03:00 on 3/11/14, 249 the magnitude error is reduced to 5% but the phase error remains at 2 hours. 
Ensemble Model (MOGREPS) Results

257
For all forecast lead times, there is a large spread in the capacity factor across the 12 different 258 ensemble members on the afternoon of 3/11/2014 (see Figure 9 ). It is clear from the figures that the 259 ensemble mean grossly underestimates the variability in generation. This is due to the smoothing that 260 occurs when averaging over the ensemble members and highlights the importance of considering the 261 trajectory of individual ensemble members when estimating ramp events. 262
An assessment of the forecast of the different ensemble members has been made focussing on the 263 period from 12:00 to 18:00 on 3/11/2014. To prevent large differences between successive forecasts, 264 the forecasts from consecutive initialisation times are typically combined to produce a 24 member 265 ensemble. For the forecast initialised at 09:00 and 15:00 on 02/11/2014 (27-21 hours prior to the 266 ramp), the majority of the members have relatively high generation during the period; however 21% 267 of members show a ramp with a magnitude of at least 20%. As the forecast lead time decreases the 268 number of members predicting a ramp (R>20%) increases (see Table 3 ). For the forecast based on 269 initialisation times of 03:00 and 09:00 UTC on 3/11/2014, there is a 75% probability of a ramp 270 occurring (18 members forecast a ramp). Table 3 also shows that some ensemble members do predict 271 a very large ramping event (R>40%) during the 3 hours either side of when the event occurred. For 272 example, for the forecast at 12:00 on 02/11/2014 there is a 16.7% probability of a large ramp 273 9 (R>40%) occurring in this period. This increases to 33.3% for the forecast at 06:00 on 03/11/2014. 274
However, the probabilities are significantly reduced when the time window is restricted to 1 hour 275 either side of the event-indicating a phase error in the forecast. 276
For each ensemble member with a predicted ramp in the time window 12:00-18:00, the magnitude 277 and phase error has been determined. In general, the magnitude of the ramps predicted by the 278 individual ensemble members becomes more accurate as the lead time decreases. Figure 10 shows 279 that the latest forecast (initialised at 09:00 on 3/11/2014) has 7 out of 12 members predicting a 280 ramping event, with a range of magnitudes from 17-70%, but for two members the magnitude error is 281 less than 5%. Figure 10 also shows that the magnitude error of the ramps predicted by the UKV1.5 282 model is relatively low (less than 8%) for all lead times, this is lower than all but one ensemble 283 member for the corresponding MOGREPS forecast. was caused by a trough which formed behind a large weather front. The trough was a relatively small 293 feature (spatial extent of approximately 100-150 km) and therefore the ramping was localised to the 294 wind farms in the Thames Estuary. The size of the feature presents a series of challenges to 295 forecasting ramping events of this nature. Firstly, uncertainty in its location can have a significant 296 impact on the predicted wind generation. For example, the high resolution deterministic forecast 297 predicted the presence of the trough at a lead time of 24 hours, however as the feature is not predicted 298 in exactly the right location there is a large error in the predicted wind power of the cluster. This error 299 can be reduced by estimating the power output using the maximum wind speed within a given area of 300 the turbines rather than the wind speed at the exact location of each turbine. Secondly, the size of the 301 feature also means that it is unlikely to be captured in a wind power forecast which uses the ensemble 302 mean. As shown in section 4.3, individual ensemble members capture the feature but in slightly 303 different locations, so the mean smears out the increased generation. 304
Despite the relatively small size of the feature, the high resolution deterministic model was able to 305 forecast the ramping event at a lead time of 24 hours but with a phase error of -2 hours and a 306 magnitude error of -8%. When the lead time reduced to 12 hours, the magnitude of the ramp was 307 accurately forecast to within 5% but the phase error remained at 2 hours (but opposite sign). In 308 addition, a number of ensemble members also predicted a ramp up to 36 hours in advance. For lead 309 times from 36 down to 6 hours there was a large spread in the ensemble members for the period 310 during which the ramping occurred, indicating large uncertainty in the predicted wind generation. 311
Access to such forecasts would have allowed National Grid to have prepared for the ramping event in 312 advance, reducing the number of transactions required in the balancing mechanism and ultimately the 313 cost of electricity. 314
While the NWP models were shown to be of benefit for this particular, high-impact case study, 315 further work is required to place the performance of the models in to context. The skill of the models 316 at predicting local ramping events could be determined over a long time period (large number of 317 ramping events) and compared to that of a low resolution global NWP model. This would quantify the 318 benefit of high resolution models and determine the bounds of predictability of local ramping events. 319 320 321 with a trend towards very large offshore wind farms clustered together in several zones. This study 332 has shown these clusters can experience large ramping events on time scales of less than 6 hours as 333 the impact of local meteorological phenomena on the power production is strong. For example, for the 334 wind farms in the Thames Estuary, 10% of the ramps over a 6 hour time window were in excess of 335 30% of the total capacity. Due to the large capacity of the farms, these wind power fluctuations can 336 present challenges for the system operator in maintaining the balance between supply and demand on 337 a national scale.
338
A case study of the wind farms in the Thames Estuary has shown the implications of an unpredicted 339 local ramping event on the cost of balancing the power system. On 3 rd November 2014, there was an 340 increase in power output of 1.1 GW within 2 hours and 45 minutes, followed almost immediately by a 341 1.2 GW reduction in output within 1 hour and 50 minutes. As this event was not captured by the 342 forecast used by the system operator the market was long by 570 MWh at 15:30 (due to the 343 unexpected pick-up in the generation in the Thames Estuary) and then short by 820 MWh at 17:00 as 344 the generation had drastically reduced. The large imbalance coincided with a period of very high 345 demand and therefore there were fewer generation units available to help the system operator to 346 balance the system. Consequently, expensive short term operating reserve was deployed which led to 347 a spike in the system buy price of 183 per MWh which was the 16 th highest price during the year. 348
The construction of even larger offshore wind zones, outlined in Round 3 of the UK's offshore wind 349 development would exacerbate this problem. Furthermore, a number of other nations are seeking to 350 dramatically increase their own offshore wind capacity. Consequently, there is a need for accurate 351 regional wind power forecasts to minimise the costs of managing the system. In recent years a number 352 of state-of-the-art high resolution forecast models have been developed. For this case study, these 353 models were able to capture the meteorological feature which caused the localised ramping at a lead 354 time of up to 24 hours and therefore the use of these forecasts would have been of benefit to the 355 system operator. As system operators continue to seek to improve their forecasting of weather 356 dependent renewable generation, the new forecast models should be considered. However, further 357 work is required to determine how well the model captures the high frequency ramping for a larger 358 number of events. 359 360
This study has also shown that careful interpretation of the forecast is required. For example, due to 361 possible errors in the position of small scale meteorological features in the models, a wind power 362 forecast derived from the predicted wind speeds at the exact location of each turbine can contain large 363 errors. It is therefore recommended that wind power estimates are based on the maximum wind speed 364 within a given area of the turbines. In addition, the ensemble mean power forecast is not suitable 365 when considering ramping events due to the smoothing that occurs when averaging over the ensemble 366 members. This highlights the importance of considering the trajectory of individual ensemble 367 members when estimating ramp events as well as the information about forecast uncertainty that they 368 provide. 369 370
